Objective: To report a probable case of laboratory-acquired typhoid fever involving a female laboratory technologist at a major diagnostic bacteriology laboratory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Typhoid fever remains an important public health problem in the developing world. In a rapidly developing country like Malaysia, increased urbanization has actually witnessed an increase in the incidence of cases. The causative agent of disease is Salmonella @phi. It is spread through food, drinks, and sometimes directly through contaminated laboratory equipment and poor laboratory practices. Laboratory-acquired infections caused by bacterial, viral, fungal, rickettsial, and parasitic agents have been recognized since the beginning of this century.l Laboratory workers have occasionally become infected by these microorganisms with which they are working, and some of these infections have resulted in death. For example, of the 20 typhoid deaths reported by Pike,l 15 occurred in Germany, 1 was reported in France, and 4 occurred in the United States. During a 33month study in the United States by Blaser et aL2 24 cases, or 2.4% of all typhoid cases reported, were laboratory-acquired typhoid fever. Laboratory-associated cases of salmonellosis are also well documented in a number of published reports and surveys. For example, in Great Britain, the overall incidence of Salmonella infection is 0.137 infections per 1000 persons. Most of the workers affected have been microbiologists. However, in most countries endemic for Salmonella typhi infection, like Malaysia, reports on laboratory-acquired infections are scarce, and there have been no published reports on this. The actual risk and incidence of laboratory-acquired infection is difficult to measure, but is bound to be significant as the laboratory workload increases as a result of increased disease activity. Also, surveillance data on laboratory-associated infections are difficult to obtain, because the infections are often subclinical and have an atypical incubation period and route of infection. Moreover, laboratory directors may not report any laboratory-related incidents for fear of reprisal or embarrassment. This report presents a probable case of laboratory-acquired typhoid fever involving a laboratory technologist in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The laboratory technologist involved (36-yr-old female) is employed at a major diagnostic bacteriology laboratory in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. She showed clinical symptoms of typhoid fever and was admitted to the Journal of Infectious Diseases / Volume 1, Number 2, November 1996 Kuala Lumpur Hospital. Salmonella typhi was isolated from a stool specimen, and was maintained and identified by standard methods. 3 The patient was treated with antibiotics and subsequently made an uneventful recovery, after 2 weeks of therapy Unfortunately, a detailed clinical report of the patient's symptoms was not available. Subsequently, S. typhi isolates from this individual and other S. typbi isolates (which had been handled by this technologist at the time of the incident) were analyzed using Vi phage typing, antibiotic sensitivity testing, and pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Vi phage typing of the isolates was performed according to standard procedures by the Salmonella Reference Centre at the Institute for Medical Research, Kuala Lumpur. Repeated subculturing of isolates was avoided and stocks of the primary isolates were maintained at -70°C. SaZmoneZZa typhi isolates were tested for sensitivity to ampicillin, chloramphenicol, tetracycline, kanamycin, sulfamethoxazole, trimethoprim, carbenicillin, ciproxozime, and nalidixic acid by standard disk-diffusion procedures to measure resistance, according to National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards (NCCLS) guidelines. Genomic DNA for PFGE analysis was prepared by the method previously described.*p5 The intact chromosomal DNA was then digested with four restriction enzymes, XbaI (5'-TCTAGA-3'), SpeI (5'-ACTAGT-3'), AvrII (5'-CCTAGG-3') and Not1 (5'-GCGGCCGC3') (New England Biolabs, Beverly, MA), as previously described.* Restricted DNA fragments were then separated by PFGE, using the contour-clamped homogeneous electric field (CHEF) method on a CHEF DR-II or DR-III system (Bio-Rad Laboratories, Richmond, CA) in gels of 1% agarose in 0.5X TBE buffer (0.1 M Tris, 0.1 M boric acid, 0.2 mM EDTA) for 24 hours at 200 V at a temperature of 14°C with ramped pulsed times varying according to the enzymes used (ranging from 1 to 50 set). Gels were stained with ethidium bromide and photographed with an ultraviolet transilluminator (Spectroline Co., Westbury, NY; USA, 302 nm). The DNA size standards used were a lambda ladder consisting of concatemers and MidRange II PFG Marker (New England Biolabs, Beverley, MA, USA).
The phage types and antibiograms of the isolate from the infected technologist were identical to those of the laboratory strains (Table l) , Both the isolates were of phage type El and showed multiple resistance to ampicillin, chloramphenicol, tetracycline, kanamycin, sulfamethoxazole, and trimethoprim. The isolate was obtained from the laboratory technologist 12 days after the suspected laboratory isolate was cultured in the laboratory Except for these two isolates, all the other isolates analyzed (more than 100 isolates) were sensitive to the antibiotics tested (data not shown). Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis analysis following digestion of chromosomal DNA with the XbaI, SpeI, AvrII, and Not1 showed that the two isolates were identical (see Table 1 ). Two DNA profiles obtained with X&a1 and SpeI are shown in Figure 1 . Stable and reproducible PFGE patterns comprising 15 to 24 fragments were obtained with the four restriction endonucleases.
The history of laboratory-acquired typhoid fever in the United States has been well documented since 1915.2 Typhoid fever has accounted for more reported deaths than any other laboratory-acquired infecti0n.l However, such documentations are not available in Malaysia and other developing countries. Because of the higher risk of contamination with the infectious agent to the personnel directly involved in the laboratory work, the laboratory can be a significant reservoir of S. typhi.l The most common routes of infection include ingestion of microorganisms through mouth pipetting, transfer of organisms to the mouth from contaminated items such as pencils or fingers6 consumption of food and drinks in the laboratory,' and accidental splashes that fall into the mouth. Specimen collection, processing, and manipulation of cultures during routine laboratory operations frequently contaminate containers and bench top equipment through the generation of aerosols8 Some further observations can be made from the results of the present study. First, of the many S. typbi isolates processed by the technologist in the course of her work, the one that was transmitted to her was a strain possessing multiple resistance to several antibiotics. A similar case of laboratory-acquired typhoid fever in Malaysia involved a graduate student working with antibiotic-resistant S. typbi (unpublished observation). In contrast, another laboratory working with hundreds of nonresistant S. typhi has not had an incident of laboratoryacquired infection. This suggests that antibiotic-resistant S. typhi was more virulent or infective and that a lower infectious dose is required to cause disease. The suggestion that antibiotic-resistant S. typhi is more virulent than endemic strains has been made previously.9 Although the absolute identity (by PFGE) of the two isolates in this particular case report has more definitively identified the origin of the infecting strain. The present study also reiterates the fact that laboratory personnel can be at increased risk of being contaminated with S. typhi. The paucity of data on laboratory-acquired enteric infection in this country does not imply that this problem is uncommon. A laboratory worker is constantly being exposed to the pathogen, and control of laboratory infection must be based on strict adherence to standards for laboratory safety. There is an urgent need to consolidate efforts to document all cases of Salmonella infection, including laboratory-acquired infections.
Such surveillance data are necessary for better and more effective control of this important human pathogen.
